The moral principles found in philosophy and embodied in law are often strikingly complex, seemingly peculiar, and yet resolutely persistent. For instance, it was long held in Britain that a person could be tried for murder only if the victim died within a year and a day of the crime. And in the United States, if a robber gets into a shootout with a cop and the cop's bullet hits a bystander, the robber can be charged with murdering the bystander. Naively, one might have assumed that murder could be defined simply as "causing another person to die." In fact, the modern Model Penal Code requires pages of fine print to explain the details, just as it has over many decades and several comprehensive revisions.
cases. The results were striking: Philosophers were 30% more likely to endorse the DDE -an abstract, explicit moral principle -when they had previously viewed specific moral dilemmas in the order "switch/push" rather than "push/switch." This effect was just as strong among philosophers who specialized in ethics and had a completed PhD as it was among those with other specialty areas and a Master's degree. And it was replicated using a second, independent moral principle known as moral luck.
These results have two important implications. First, they provide evidence that philosophers' endorsement of particular moral principles can depend substantially on their prior intuitive judgments regarding particular cases. Second, they demonstrate that philosophical training does not inoculate against the influence of morally 'irrelevant' factors (such as the order in which two cases are presented) on principled reasoning. 3 Reflective equilibrium surely plays a critical role in constraining explicit moral theories. Nevertheless, it appears that intuitive processes of moral judgment can influence philosophical theories in ways that are both powerful and unseen. In the next section, we explain how these processes cause explicit moral principles to reflect processing features of non-moral cognitive processes, thereby causing the principles to inherit the cognitive processes' complexity.
Complexity
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court announced a landmark decision upholding New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide. 4 The case turned on the merits of a simple comparative question: Is killing a person the same as allowing him or her to die? According to law, a physician must respect a patient's wish to withhold lifesaving medication -that is, doctors can be required to allow a patient to die. Defenders of a right to physician assisted suicide asserted that the distinction between active physician assisted suicide (e.g., administering a lethal dose of morphine) and passive physician assisted suicide (e.g., withholding a lifesaving dose of antibiotics) is nothing more than a semantic sleight of hand. Either way, they argued, the patient's death depends on the doctor's choice. But the Court disagreed. The majority opinion in Vacco v. Quill held that there is a significant moral distinction between actively killing and passively allowing to die.
The moral distinction between active and passive harm is well-represented in the philosophical literature (Fischer & Ravizza, 1992) , and it has been shown to play a large and consistent role in structuring ordinary people's moral judgments (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Cushman et al., 2006; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991) . From a certain perspective, however, it is hard to explain or to justify. Consider again the defendant's claim in Vacco v. Quill: In both cases the doctor's decision is unequivocally responsible for the patient's death. Why do people judge active harm to be morally worse than passive harm?
Here, we explore a simple hypothesis: Actions typically support more robust, automatic attributions of causation and intention. Because these attributions constitute basic inputs into the process of moral judgment, the action/omission attribution has an impact on moral judgment. In essence, the moral distinction depends on processing features of non-moral cognitive processes such as causal attribution and intentional attribution.
For example, consider John who rolls a ball toward 12 pins (an action) and Jane who stands by and allows the ball to roll (an omission). John might be considered more causally responsible for the pins falling than Jane is, and also to have intended the pins to fall more than Jane did. This is an example of the action vs. omission distinction operating in non-moral attributions of causation and intention. Possibly, the action/omission distinction carries through to affect moral judgments in the context of harmful behavior because causal responsibility for harm and intent to cause harm are key determinants of moral judgments. Replace the 12 pins with an innocent child, and John might look morally more culpable than Jane because he appears to have caused the child harm and intended the harm more than Jane.
Experimental evidence bears out this hypothesis. People's judgments of nonmoral actions and omissions (e.g., the bowling case) do reveal systematic discrepancies in causal attribution and intentional attribution (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, in prep) . Specifically, people assign more causal responsibility to actions than to omissions, and they are more likely to consider actions intentional. Indeed, there is some evidence that actions support more robust causal inferences about an agent's goal (similar to intent) even during infancy (Cushman, Fieman, Schnell, Costa, & Carey, in prep) . In the relevant study, six-to seven-month-old infants watched as a hand repeatedly reached for and grasped a series of objects. In the "consistent action" condition, the hand always reached for one object (e.g., a ball), preferring it to any other object (a banana, a box, a watch, etc.). Infants in the action condition showed a robust expectation that the hand would continue to reach for the ball, as revealed by the length of their looks to expected versus unexpected events. In the "consistent omission" condition, the hand always omitted to reach for the ball, preferring to reach instead for any other object. Infants in the omission condition failed to form any expectation about the hand's future behavior; they were entirely unsurprised to see the hand change course and prefer the ball to future objects.
This suggests that infants have an easier time inferring goals from consistent actions ("he always goes for the ball") than from consistent omissions ("he never goes for the ball"), even when the evidence in favor of each inference is equal.
It is well-known that moral judgments depend substantially, although not exclusively, on assessments of causal responsibility for harm and intent to harm (Alicke, 1992; Darley & Shultz, 1990; Piaget, 1965 Piaget, /1932 Royzman & Baron, 2002; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007) . If actions support more robust attributions of causal responsibility and intent, this may account for the moral distinction between active harm and passive harm. To establish this causal connection between non-moral attributions and moral judgments, Cushman and colleagues (in prep) took advantage of a recent finding that the judgment of deserved punishment relies significantly more on causal attributions than does the judgment of moral wrongness . Thus, if causal attribution is partially responsible for the moral distinction between actions and omissions, then the moral distinction should be larger in the judgment of deserved punishments than in the judgments of moral wrongness. This is precisely what the study revealed.
Further evidence for the role of causal attribution in the action/omission distinction comes from a series of studies by Baron and colleagues (Asch et al., 1994; Baron & Ritov, 2004; Ritov & Baron, 1999; Royzman & Baron, 2002; Spranca et al., 1991) . They consistently found that (1) many people explicitly state that actions are more 'causal' than omissions, (2) people who make that assessment are much more likely to judge harmful actions to be morally worse than harmful omissions, and (3) A recent study addressed this question by using functional neuroimaging to infer the cognitive processes underlying the action/omission distinction (Cushman, Murray, GordonMcKeon, Wharton, & Greene, in prep) . Of particular interest was activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a region associated with the explicit, controlled application of abstract rules to a problem (Bunge & Wallis, 2007) . The DLPFC was found to be significantly more active when subjects judged harmful omissions, compared to when they judged harmful actions. Taken alone, this evidence is compatible with either of the hypotheses we considered above. Possibly, activation in the DLPFC reflects the application of an explicit principled rule exonerating omissions: "The doctor is not responsible because he simply allowed the patient to die, but he didn't really cause the death." An alternative possibility is that activation in the DLPFC reflects the need to deploy controlled cognitive processes to condemn omissions: "The doctor is responsible because the patient's death depended on his purposeful decision." On this latter hypothesis, actions require less controlled, less deliberate DLPFC processing than omissions because automatic psychological mechanisms robustly condemn actions but not omissions.
These two hypotheses make opposite predictions about which participants will show the greatest amount of DLPFC activity when judging omissions. If the activity reflects the application of an explicit moral rule exonerating omissions, then people who show the greatest difference in judgment between actions and omissions should also show the most DLPFC activity. Alternatively, if the activity reflects the necessity of controlled processes to interpret and condemn harmful omissions, then people who show the smallest difference in judgment between actions and omissions should show the most DLPFC activity. This second pattern is what we observed: DLPFC activity during the judgment of omissions was significantly correlated with their condemnation. Thus, while people are able to report an explicit rule that accounts for the action/omission distinction after the fact, this study failed to provide evidence for the deployment of such a rule during the process of judgment itself. Instead, the evidence suggested that extra controlled, cognitive processing is necessary to equate harmful omissions with harmful actions. The automatic processes that support the judgment of harmful actions appear to be insufficient for the condemnation of harmful omissions.
In summary, it appears that the moral distinction between actions and omissions depends at least in part on non-moral processes of causal and intentional attribution. People-perhaps even young infants-tend to form more robust causal and intentional attributions from actions than from omissions. Automatic processes of moral judgment rely on these attributions of causation and intent as key inputs. Consequently, the non-moral action/omission distinction leads harmful actions to be judged morally worse than harmful omissions. As we saw in the previous section, consistent patterns of moral judgment constitute an important basis for the abstraction of general moral principles. In this way, the basic cognitive processes that young infants use to understand actions and events may contribute importantly to the moral doctrines endorsed by the US Supreme Court.
If the general structure of this argument is correct -if explicit moral principles reflect the processing features of relatively automatic, non-moral processes of causal and intentional attribution -then we can begin to explain some of the pervasive complexity of those explicit moral principles. Moral complexity may be inherited from the much more general complexity of the cognitive mechanisms we use to interpret actions and events. By analogy, Pinker (2007) has argued that many of the complex rules governing the grammaticality of verbs depends on general (i.e., non-linguistic) processing features of those very same cognitive systems. From this perspective, moral rules and grammatical rules are two lenses through which we can perceive the structure of human thought. In the next section, we take up another question: Why is it that some of the moral principles projected through this lens look so peculiar?
Peculiarity
There is a certain paradox in our "intuitive" reaction to the moral distinction between active and passive harm that lurked in the background of the previous section. On the one hand, we argued that basic, early-emerging and relatively automatic mechanisms of causal and intentional attribution respond much more robustly to actions than to omissions. On the other hand, we argued that from a certain perspective the action/omission distinction looks "peculiar" because a doctor who deliberately withholds lifesaving treatment both causes and intends the patient's death. So which is it? Is our brain wired to see a difference between actions and omissions or to treat them identically?
In this section, we argue that the answer is both. We are quite literally "of two minds"
when it comes to concepts of causation, intent, and morality (Bargh, 1999; Cushman & Young, 2009; Cushman et al., 2006; Greene, 2008; Greene & Cohen, 2004; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Sloman, 1996; White, 1990) . Automatic, intuitive systems of action and event understanding
show differential sensitivity to actions and omissions; meanwhile, controlled, rational systems of action and event understanding show identical sensitivity. This is why the DLPFC showed heightened activity during judgments of harmful omissions among people who judged omissions to be as bad as actions: Those people were required to use controlled cognitive processes to arrive at the guilty verdict. Consequently, the action/omission distinction looks peculiar to one of our minds: speaking very roughly, to the DLPFC. The 'sense' of the distinction is lost in the translation between automaticity and reason.
In order for us to develop this argument in more detail, it will help to take a broader perspective on the distinct features of automatic versus controlled processes of causal attribution.
Here again, a useful starting point is the law.
The Anglo-American legal tradition employs two distinct concepts of causation: "factual Anne could not reasonably be expected to foresee harm, but her husband could have.
Proximate causation is sometimes maligned by legal scholars who disapprove of a causal concept that cannot be defined and depends on factors such as forseeability, which do not seem to have anything to do with causation at all. Yet the law requires proximate causation because it succeeds brilliantly where factual causation fails: Proximate causation captures our intuitive judgments of causal and moral responsibility. At some level, it does not just capture our intuitions-it is our intuitions. Although attempts have been made to characterize proximate causation, it does not exist as a defined doctrine; rather, it is a collection of legal precedents born in the nuanced peculiarities of individual cases and gerrymandered to suit jurists' needs.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that psychological theories of ordinary people's intuitive causal judgments resemble the legal concept of proximate cause in certain respects. For instance, consider the role of mental state information in assigning causal responsibility.
Lombrozo (2007) We have taken this detour through legal concepts of causation because they seem to parallel psychological mechanisms of causal judgment present in ordinary people. As we have seen, proximate causation captures elements of our intuitive causal judgments. Just as importantly, however, factual causation captures a prominent explicit causal theory (White, 1990) . Philosophers and psychologists often refer to the 'but for' test that defines factual causation as a 'counterfactual' theory of causation. There are other popular explicit theories of causation as well. For instance, 'mechanistic' or 'production' theories of causation trace causal histories by exclusively tracing the transfer of energy through matter.
Critically, it appears that our explicit theories of causation are incommensurable with the psychological mechanisms that produce intuitive causal judgments. To put the point metaphorically, the words in our explicit causal language simply cannot express the ideas employed by our intuitive mechanisms of causal judgments. For instance, neither counterfactual nor production theories of causation have any place for mental state concepts such as foresight or
intent, yet mental state factors play a critical role in generating our intuitive causal judgments. If we tried to create an explicit causal theory that captured our intuitive causal judgments, using only the conceptual resources available within counterfactual and production theories, the resulting theory would probably be both complicated and insufficient. Alternatively, we could construct an explicit theory that draws on representations of others' mental states, but then we would no longer recognize it as a causal theory. By the lights of our explicit causal theories, foreseeability simply does not belong. If this sounds familiar, there is a good reason: When legal scholars try to define proximate causation explicitly, what they end up with is complicated, insufficient, and alarmingly un-causal.
The incommensurability of explicit theories and intuitive mechanisms of judgment plays a key role in explaining why complex moral principles are generalized from what may be simple moral rules -and why they can look so peculiar. Let us suppose that intuitive moral judgments of harmful actions are generated by an extremely simple computation: An agent acted wrongly if her actions intentionally caused harm. Additionally, let us suppose that the representational inputs into this computation are intuitive attributions of causation and intention. Now, assume that a person attempts to generalize an explicit moral theory over his or her pattern of intuitive judgments. As a first pass, the person constructs the following theory: "An agent acted wrongly if his or her actions intentionally caused harm." But the available explicit theories of causation and intention will produce counter-intuitive moral judgments whenever those theories are at variance with their intuitive counterparts. This unfortunate person is now left trying to build an explicit moral theory that captures intuitive moral judgments, but using explicit conceptual resources that are incommensurable with the psychological mechanisms that determine his or her intuitive moral judgments. What the person ends up with is complicated, insufficient, and sometimes alarmingly un-moral. In short, he or she ends up with moral principles that look peculiar, like the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. In the final section, we ask why those peculiar-looking moral principles are so persistent.
Persistence
Our model of the origins of moral principles resembles a train wreck in slow motion.
Philosophers, legal scholars, and ordinary people construct moral principles based in part on their automatic, intuitive moral judgments. Those judgments reflect processing features of relatively automatic, intuitive processes of action and event understanding, such as causal and intentional attribution. Consequently, features such as the distinction between active and passive harm end up in our explicit moral principles. But some of the basic processing features of automatic action and event understanding seem to be incommensurable with our explicit, rational theories of causation and intent. Thus, distinctions like the action/omission distinction seem peculiar even while they capture some intuitive sense of right and wrong. If those distinctions are so peculiar, why do they persist?
To bring the question into sharper focus, it will help to contrast moral principles with scientific principles. One of the enduring metaphors of the cognitive revolution is the 'person as a scientist'. The idea is that people have explicit theories (also called 'folk theories') that describe, explain, and predict the world around them. Of course, when we construct explicit theories about the world we are forced to rely on representational input from lower-level, automatic systems. Dennett (1991) has mocked the notion of a 'Cartesian Theater', a removed vantage point from which a person watches his or her own mental processes. But if we take the notion of the 'person as scientist' seriously, there is such a vantage point: The theater is occupied by a scientist who is using controlled psychological processes to interpret the representational output of automatic psychological systems putting on a show.
